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University of Amsterdam & Stanford University
By a spatial logic, we understand any formal language interpreted over a class
of structures featuring geometrical entities and relations, broadly construed.
The formal language in question may employ any logical syntax: that of ﬁrst-
order logic, or some fragment of ﬁrst-order logic, or perhaps higher-order logic.
The structures over which it is interpreted may inhabit any class of geometrical
‘spaces’: topological spaces, afﬁne spaces, metric spaces, or perhaps a single
space such a the projective plane or Euclidean 3-space. And the non-logical
primitives of the language may be interpreted as any geometrical properties
or relations deﬁned over the relevant domains: topological connectedness of
regions, parallelism of lines, or perhaps equidistance of two points from a
third. What all these logics have in common is that the operative notion of
validity depends on the underlying geometry of the structures over which their
distinctively spatial primitives are interpreted. Spatial logic, then, is simply the
study of the family of spatial logics, so conceived.
An analogy will help elucidate this rather austere-looking deﬁnition. From
our stance, spatial logic parallels the more established area of temporal logic.
A temporal logic is a formal language interpreted over some class of structures
based on frameworks of temporal relations, broadly construed. The language
in question, though usually some modal fragment of ﬁrst- or higher-order logic,
may in principle employ any logical syntax; the objects over which that syntax
is interpreted may include points, paths, or extended intervals over any variety
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of partial orders; and the assumed partial order ultimately provides the interpre-
tation for the distinctively temporal primitives of the formal language. What
all temporal logics have in common, whether point- or interval-based, is that
their operative notion of validity depends on the assumed properties of the un-
derlying temporal ﬂow. And what gives them their enduring appeal is the way
in which the formal languages they employ balance expressive power against
computational complexity. In this respect, temporal logic is the computation-
ally motivated study of time.
Let us set the scene for the treatment of spatial logic in this book by examining
some of the historical trends that have given rise to it. Classical geometry, the
cultural model of deductive proof par excellence since Euclid’s Elements, was
ﬁnally analyzed in full mathematical precision in Hilbert’s Grundlagen der
Geometrie (Hilbert, 1909; see also Hilbert, 1950), when all its axioms, and
possible variations on them, had become clear. Yet, despite its starkly abstract
view of points, lines and planes, the Grundlagen is still couched not in a formal
language, but rather in (lightly mathematicized) idiomatic German. Hilbert’s
Axiom of Parallels provides a good example:
Let a be a line, and A a point not on a. Then, in the plane determined by a and A,
there is at most one line which passes through A and does not meet a. (tr. from
Hilbert, 1909, p. 20)
No attempt is made to tease out the implicit logical syntax of this language,
or to analyze the underlying inference engine much beyond what Euclid had
already done in his Common Notions. This is perhaps clearest in the case of
Hilbert’s ﬁnal Axiom of Completeness:
The elements (points, lines, planes) of the geometry form a system of objects
which is not capable of any extension, subject to maintenance of all the preceding
axioms. That is to say: it is not possible to add to the system of points, lines and
planes another system of objects in such a way that, in the combined system, all
[previous] axioms are satisﬁed. (Ibid., p. 22.)
It was not until after the development of the apparatus of formal logic and model-
theoretic semantics in the ﬁrst half of the Twentieth Century that logicians were
able to probe the precise inferential and expressive resources of geometry, in
a second round of formalization culminating in Tarski’s Elementary Geometry
(Tarski, 1959).
Tarski’s decisive contribution in his 1959 paper was not simply to force
Hilbert’s axioms into the regimented syntax of some formal language, but
rather, to investigate what happens when that syntax is restricted. Speciﬁ-
cally, Tarski employs a ﬁrst-order logic, with variables ranging over points in
the Euclidean plane, and with non-logical predicates standing for two primitive
spatial relations: a ternary relation of ‘betweenness’ and a quaternary relation
of ‘equidistance’. The resulting language is sufﬁciently expressive to formu-
late much of Euclidean geometry—for example, Pythagoras’ theorem, or the
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existence of the nine-point Feuerbach circle. The computational reward for
this loss of expressive power is considerable. Tarski showed that the theory of
elementary geometry is decidable: there is a mechanical procedure to deter-
mine, of any given sentence in the relevant language, whether that sentence is
true under the advertised interpretation. By contrast, the second-order theory
needed to express all of Hilbert’s axioms is undecidable.
Tarski’s discovery illustrates the most distinctive feature of logic in the wake
of the model-theoretic revolution of the previous century: its fundamentally lin-
guistic orientation. The model-theoretic approach to logic takes as its central
concern the often intricate relationship between mathematical structures and
languages which describe them. On this view, spatial logic, as deﬁned above,
becomes the study of the relationship between geometrical structures and the
spatial languages which describe them. It is this preoccupation with language
which divides spatial logic from geometry as traditionally conceived. More
recently, of course, the enterprise of automating logical deduction using elec-
tronic computers has necessitated new levels of precision and sophistication
in reasoning about the properties of formal languages and their relationship to
their subject matter. In this setting, the issue of balancing the expressive power
of a language against the computational complexity of performing deductions
within it occupies centre-stage.
We can broaden our perspective by considering two further examples of spa-
tial logics in addition to Tarski’s Elementary Geometry. To motivate our second
example, recall that, in Elementary Geometry, all variables are taken to range
over points in the Euclidean plane. This allows for quantiﬁcation over geometri-
cal ﬁgures deﬁned by a ﬁxed number of points, such as line segments, triangles,
circles, and so on, but not over spatial constellations deﬁned by point-sets of
arbitrary ﬁnite size, such as polygons, let alone those deﬁned by inﬁnite sets of
points, such as, for example, arbitrary connected regions. The question there-
fore arises as to what happens when these restrictions are lifted. In fact, Tarski
himself had already investigated such a language in his Geometry of Solids
(Tarski, 1956). This system employs the syntax of second-order logic, with the
object variables ranging not over points, but instead over certain ‘regions’ in
three-dimensional Euclidean space (hence, the set-variables range over sets of
regions). The regions in question—Tarski called them solids—are the regular
closed subsets of R3, namely, those subsets of R3 equal to the closure of their
interior. Tarski’s language features two non-logical predicates: one standing
for the binary relation of parthood, the other for the unary property of being
spherical. Again, Tarski establishes a remarkable fact about the relationship
between the formal language and the structure it is interpreted over: the resulting
theory can be axiomatized completely (in a second-order sense), and moreover
is categorical: all models of this theory are isomorphic to the standard inter-
pretation on the reals. This sort of axiomatization in very powerful logical
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languages has found many successors, e.g., in qualitative axiomatizations of
physics.
For our third example of a spatial logic, we turn to topology. While Euclidean
geometry is associated with rigid transformations like translations, rotations,
and inversions, the mathematicians creating topology in the early decades of
the 20th Century focused on much coarser transformations deforming
shapes up to tearing and knotting. Subsequent to its invention, topology, too,
became an object of logical study, and yet again, Tarski’s work proved seminal.
Tarski observed that topology has small decidable fragments which could be
brought to light by treating the topological interior operation as a modal oper-
ator (McKinsey and Tarski, 1944). The connection to the other spatial logics
discussed above becomes apparent if we subject McKinsey and Tarski’s original
modal language to some essentially cosmetic reformulation. The variables of
this language are taken to range over arbitrary subsets of any ﬁxed topological
space. These variables may be combined to form complex terms by means of
function-symbols denoting various set-theoretic operations (union, intersection
and complement), and topological operations (interior and closure); such terms
denote subsets of the topological space over which they are interpreted. With
terms constructed in this way, the language then features equality as its only
predicate. Here we have extreme poverty of expressive resources: primitive
function-symbols expressing only set-theoretic and topological operations, no
non-logical predicates, and no quantiﬁers. But there is again a computational
reward: the satisﬁability problem for this logic is decidable in polynomial space.
While too inexpressive to represent much of topology, this language has had
profound repercussions in other areas, in particular in the universal algebra of
Boolean algebras with added operators, and much contemporary modal logic.
Furthermore, it has also been the inspiration for much recent work on topo-
logical logics, many of them equipped with more elaborate syntax and richer
topological primitives, as the reader of this book will soon discover.
With these examples to guide us, let us return to the abstract characterization
of spatial logic with which we began. Spatial logics arise by making a number
of design choices, along three principal dimensions. The ﬁrst concerns the col-
lection of geometrical entities which make up our interpretations: points, lines,
regions (of various kinds), and so on. In Tarski’s (plane) Elementary Geometry,
variables range over the collection of points in the Euclidean plane; likewise,
in his Geometry of Solids, variables range over the collection of regular closed
subsets of R3; and in his modal topological language, variables range over
the collection of all subsets of some topological space. The second principal
dimension concerns the choice of primitive relations and operations over these
entities to interpret the non-logical primitives of our language. This choice of
primitives of course reﬂects the level of spatial structure the particular logic
is concerned with—metric, afﬁne, projective, or topological; but even within
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these broad divisions, there is room for almost endless variation. The third prin-
cipal dimension concerns the purely logical resources at our disposal. We have
already seen that these can be set at many levels: from weak ‘constraint’ lan-
guages through to richer ﬁrst-order languages or even higher-order formalisms
which include the resources of set theory. Needless to say, none of the choices
along these principal dimensions is intrinsically right or wrong: they simply
parametrize the family of available spatial logics.
Classiﬁcation of geometrical languages in terms of the range of the spa-
tial primitives they feature of course recalls the long-standing classiﬁcation of
‘geometries’, broadly conceived, given by Klein’s Erlanger Programm (Klein,
1893b; see also Klein, 1893a). And indeed the most sophisticated accounts of
expressive power of such languages today are couched in terms of invariance
relations between models (isomorphism, bisimulation, and the like), much in
the same spirit. However, the logical approach opens up many new possibilities
in this regard, such as, for instance, a new sort of invariance between topologi-
cal patterns, much coarser even than topological homeomorphism, viz. modal
bisimulation. This is topology taken to the extreme, but there are interesting
interpretations in terms of model comparison games—a style of thinking which
might have appealed to the founders of geometry, given Brouwer’s early use of
games in deﬁning the notion of topological dimension (Brouwer, 1913, p. 148).
Once we have ﬁxed a spatial logic, four salient issues present themselves.
First, how can we characterize its valid formulas? Second, what is its expres-
sive power? Third, what is its computational complexity? And fourth, what
alternative interpretations does it have? We brieﬂy consider each of these in
turn. The ﬁrst issue is so familiar as to require little explanation. Given a formal
language interpreted over a certain class of geometrical structures, it typically
makes sense to ask (depending on details of syntax) which sentences of that
language are true in all structures of that class. Mostly, these characterizations
are couched in the form of a list of axioms and (ﬁnitary) rules-of-inference.
However, there are cases where additional machinery is required, for example,
where the set of validities is not recursively enumerable, or where explicit proof
systems are required to provide geometrical ‘constructions’ in Euclid’s sense.
Second, we have already noted that current treatments of expressive power
in logic are derived from the geometrical notions of invariance relations across
models, setting the level of semantic resolution beyond which the given lan-
guage cannot probe. Examples of such invariance relations are potential iso-
morphism for ﬁrst-order logic, or bisimulation for modal languages; but there
are many more. Within given models, such relations specialize to notions of
automorphism or internal bisimulation—a viewpoint which is actually some-
what closer to the mathematician’s usual way of thinking about ‘symmetries’
of a spatial structure. Weyl at one point observed that point tuples in Euclidean
space which are related by an automorphism must satisfy the same geometrical
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formulas, and raised the converse question of whether sharing the same prop-
erties in some given logical language implies automorphism invariance (Weyl,
1949, p. 73). Indeed, invariance is not just descriptive weakness, but also the
source of information ﬂow across situations! Logical model theory has a host
of sophisticated results concerning invariance. In particular, invariance rela-
tions can be ﬁne-tuned in terms of games, such as Ehrenfeucht-Fraı¨sse´ games
matching ﬁrst-order logic. Given a notion of invariance, the model theory of
deﬁnability can start, and indeed, many results about expressive power of spatial
languages can be found in the chapters to follow.
Third, complexity-theoretic analyses of logical systems typically focus on
two problems: model-checking (determining whether a given formula is true in
a given interpretation) and satisﬁability checking (determining whether a given
formula is true in some interpretation or other). Model-checking has been little-
explored in the context of spatial logics; satisﬁability checking, by contrast,
has received much more attention. Most ﬁrst- (or higher-) order spatial logics
interpreted over familiar spatial domains are undecidable; therefore, this issue is
obviously of greatest interest when dealing with spatial logics with more limited
expressive power. A striking example is provided by spatial logics interpreted
over the regular closed sets of arbitrary topological spaces whose language
involves just Boolean connectives (no quantiﬁers) and whose spatial primitives
represent various topological relations and functions. The satisﬁability problem
for such logics is generally decidable, and its complexity has been determined
for a range of cases. In this light, spatial logics actually do pose an interesting
challenge which is not yet well-understood. The general methodology in logic
design has been to ﬁnd expressive yet decidable formalisms, cleverly steering
a middle course between the opposing evils of expressive poverty and unde-
cidability. However, methods of analysis which work with general models
are often powerless when confronted with languages interpreted over speciﬁc
structures, as is generally the case with spatial logics. Sometimes, the spatial
models over which one is working themselves support decidability for rich
languages—witness again Elementary Geometry, where it is the structure of
Euclidean space that drives the quantiﬁer elimination procedure establishing
decidability. We are still far from understanding the precise balance between
all these triggers of higher or lower complexity in spatial logics.
Fourth, and most speculatively, we have the issue of alternative interpreta-
tions. Tarski’s Geometry of Solids possesses, as we have seen, just one model
up to isomorphism, but most spatial logics have many models. To some extent,
this is just the expression of a familiar phenomenon in logic, and mathemat-
ics generally. Some theories, such as group theory or the theory of afﬁne
spaces, are designed to have many models, and the more of these there are, the
greater their range of applicability. Other theories were intended to describe
one particular structure, such as the natural numbers, Euclidean space, or most
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imperialistically of all, the set-theoretic universe. Geometry provided early
examples of how theories originally conceived as characterizations of speciﬁc
structures could turn out to have alternative models. This issue is brought to the
fore in the subject of spatial logic, where the formal systems under investigation
expressly invite the search for alternative interpretations and thus alternative
ways of conceptualizing space. Even bolder views were ventured by Beth in
the 1950s, who claimed that it was geometry’s move from one unique Space to
a plurality of ‘spaces’ that underlay the system-based methodology of modern
science and the fall ofAristotelian a priori dogmatism (Beth, 1959, Sec. 21). Be
that as it may, the present editors agree that spatial logic can have philosophical
repercussions beyond its narrower technical conﬁnes.
More prosaically, much of the renewed interest in spatial logic in recent years
has come from computer science. We identify three examples of this trend. The
ﬁrst comes from artiﬁcial intelligence, where attempts have recently been made
to develop logics of qualitative spatial reasoning. The motivation is as follows:
numerical co-ordinate descriptions of the objects which surround us are hard to
acquire, inherently error-prone, and probably unnecessary for most everyday
tasks we want to perform (or want a machine to perform); therefore—so goes
the argument—reasoning with purely qualitative descriptions of those objects’
spatial conﬁgurations is closer to human reasoning and thus will lead to more
efﬁcient and effective AI. But which qualitative spatial terms, exactly, should
we reason with? Ready-made tools from geometry or topology will not do: we
have to devise new logics for ourselves. Many of these logics are discussed in
this book.
The second example comes from the theory of spatial databases. In com-
puter applications, spatial data is frequently stored in the form of polygons (or
polyhedra)—in effect, sets of points deﬁnable by Boolean combinations of lin-
ear inequalities. These sets can be ﬁnitely represented, and their well-behaved
character makes them particularly amenable to computer processing. But in
fact there is no need to set our expressive sights so low; for polygons and
polyhedra are a special case of the more general class of semi-algebraic sets,
that is, those sets of points deﬁnable by Boolean combinations of polynomial
inequalities. Within mathematics, semi-algebraic sets form the basis for real
algebraic geometry; within computer science, they have given rise to the dis-
cipline of constraint databases. In a constraint database, spatial data is stored
in the form of ﬁrst-order formulas in the language of ﬁelds. The key fact here
is the quantiﬁer-elimination theorem for the theory of the reals. This result
allows constraint databases to be accessed effectively using queries which are
likewise written as ﬁrst-order formulas over an appropriate vocabulary. The
relevant chapter in this book explores some of the intricate logical issues that
arise from this approach to spatial data.
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Our third example comes from image processing, where it is convenient to
describe objects as sets of vectors that can be ‘added’ (taking all linear sums)
or ‘subtracted’ (taking all linear differences). By variously combining these
‘Minkowski operations’, certain useful processing tasks can be performed, as,
for example, when one set of vectors, representing an ‘eraser’, is used to ‘clean
up’ the boundary of another, representing a perceived object. Mathematical
morphology is a theory of subsets of vector spaces with the two operations
of addition and subtraction at its core; the properties of these operations are
generalized in abstract algebraic and category-theoretic ways. Looking at space
in this way brings to light a surprising amount of new structure. This theory was
not developed within mathematical logic; but the relevant chapter in this book
will show how logical patterns do arise, involving both modal and ﬁrst-order
languages, while the calculus of valid principles shows surprising analogies with
logical systems proposed in recent decades for very different purposes, such as
linear logics of computational resource management. Again, we see how new
choices of spatial objects and spatial structures lead to new mathematics—and
there is no reason to think that this creative process has yet run dry.
Finally, let us remove a possible misunderstanding, again taking a cue from
the history of geometry. Our presentation may have made it look as if there is
a vast collection of different spatial logics, each a world unto itself in terms of
objects, primitive relations, and logical strength. But one of the most striking
discoveries in the foundations of geometry in the 19th Century, prominently
displayed in Hilbert’s Grundlagen, was the fact that very different-looking
theories can turn out to be related at a deeper level of analysis. Inspiring
examples are the embeddings of non-Euclidean spaces into Euclidean ones
given by Klein and Poincare´. Likewise, spatial logics show inter-connections
which may be brought out by various means: semantic model transformations,
direct linguistic translations, and so on. Even though little is known about
the precise links between most known systems, we emphasize this point as a
reassuring thought about the coherence of the ﬁeld.
This concludes the editors’ thoughts about the general setting for this book,
while providing a way of positioning speciﬁc chapters. But of course, the real
content is in the chapters themselves, which do much more than ﬁt editorial
preconceptions. Each tells a story about a particular approach to spatial logic.
The chapters have been arranged in the following thread, though they can be
read in other orders as well.
We start in Tarski’s geometrical spirit, with ﬁrst-order languages. In Ch. 2,
Pratt-Hartmann considers ﬁrst-order topological languages interpreted over
low-dimensional Euclidean spaces, applying techniques from logical model
theory to analyze expressive power and axiomatizability. In Ch. 3, Bennett
and Du¨ntsch study both ﬁrst-order and weaker modal topological languages
over a large class of topological spaces, emphasizing basic decidable
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structures of wide use in AI and beyond. Renz and Nebel take this even further
in Ch. 4, with syntactically highly restricted constraint languages for spatial
structures, allowing for great computational efﬁciency.
From fragments of ﬁrst-order languages, there is a natural transition to modal
logics for topology, continuing the tradition started by Tarski and others in the
1930s. Ch. 5 by van Benthem and Bezhanishvili tells the story of modern
modal approaches to topology (and a few other spatial structures), emphasizing
the main axiomatic and semantic techniques developed in modern modal logic.
This theme is then continued in Ch. 6 by Parikh, Moss and Steinsvold, who
explore the other logical tradition of thinking about topology, viz. as an account
of information structure. Next, Ch. 7 by Balbiani, Goranko, Kellerman and
Vakarelov takes the modal viewpoint to the study of afﬁne and metric geometry,
moving up to ﬁrst-order languages where needed. In particular, completeness
theorems turn out to be related to the basic geometrical issue of coordinatization.
Finally, Ch. 8 by Vickers takes the epistemic view of topology to the higher
mathematical level of topos theory, merging spatial logic and epistemic logic
with category theory and type theory.
Just as in science generally, so too in spatial logic, space enters into natural
combinations with other fundamental notions. One obvious case is the combi-
nation of space and time, which is unavoidable in many practical computational
settings, and of course, also, in the foundations of physics. Ch. 9 by Kontchakov,
Kurucz, Wolter and Zakharyaschev studies temporal logics with added afﬁne
and metric modalities, using sophisticated techniques from current research on
the complexity of combined modal logics. A special case of this type of com-
bination is found in Ch. 10 by Kremer and Mints, who add a dynamic temporal
operator of one-step system evolution to modal logics of topology, and show
that this simple move provides signiﬁcant results like the Poincare´ recurrence
theorem. Finally, Ch. 11 by Andre´ka, Madara´sz and Ne´meti goes far beyond
simple modal languages of space-time, and develops both the special and the
general theory of relativity on a ﬁrst-order basis, continuing Tarski’s program
for geometry to obtain striking new foundational results which are at the same
time conceptually enlightening.
The next group of chapters represent a counterpoint to the ‘logical’ inves-
tigations so far, reporting further mathematical and computational advances.
Ch. 12 by Smyth and Webster explores the extent to which topological ideas
can be developed in discrete spaces, moving closer to the discrete topolo-
gies used in modern mathematics, pattern recognition, and image processing.
Ch. 13 by Geerts and Kuijpers describes the use of algebraic constraints for
spatial databases to describe regions in Euclidean space, reminding us of the
great tradition of analytic geometry which also underlies the coordinatizations
employed by Tarski, and by several authors in our book. Ch. 14 by Bloch,
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Heijmans and Ronse develops the theory of mathematical morphology, both
on concrete vector spaces and in algebraic abstraction, and introducing, at the
end, logical formalisms based on them.
Beyond these technical subjects, our book still has a coda. We have indi-
cated already that spatial logic also has a broader conceptual aspect. Ch. 15
by Varzi is an extensive discussion of spatial structure in the philosophical tra-
dition, both ancient and modern, using logical tools to develop philosophical
conceptions.
Despite the wealth of topics in our ﬁfteen chapters, this book also set itself
deﬁnite limits. First, we have not even exhausted the mathematical connec-
tion, witness the long-standing historical interest in ‘diagrammatic reasoning’
spawned by Euclid’s Elements, and reinforced by modern research on graphi-
cal representation of information and associated styles of inference. There are
deep issues here about the connection between symbolic and visual paradigms,
bypassed in our cheerfully technical account of ‘spatial logics’. We acknowl-
edge them; but they are beyond the scope of this book. Likewise, many further
varieties of spatial representation and spatial reasoning occur in disciplines like
linguistics and psychology, and many more patterns await formal logical study.
In addition, cognitive neuro-science tells us about the often surprising inter-
play between visual, diagrammatic, and more symbolically oriented parts of
the brain in any reasoning task. Again, we think this is a fascinating theme, and
we trust that many interesting interactions with the spatial logics of this book
will one day come to light. But we have chosen the current set of chapters for
their coherence in topic and methodology, and frankly also, their mathematical
quality. We see the broader area of spatial reasoning; we recognize its relevance
to the contents of this book; and exclusion does not imply disrespect. Broader
texts on spatial reasoning should, and no doubt will, appear. But, in putting
together this tighter book, the editors have stuck to what they see as the basic
axiom of ‘social geometry’: Always leave room for others.
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